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The Surveillance of ‘Risky Subjects’: 
Adiaphorisation through Criminal 
Records, and Contested Narratives of 
Stigma 
JAMIE GRACE *  
The article examines the way that the construction, retention 
and sharing of ‘criminality information’ in a multi-agency, 
public protection ‘routine’ places the ‘risky’ in society under 
surveillance, but also examines the way that evolving human 
rights doctrines have started to enhance the procedural rights 
of ‘subjects’ to take part in this narrative of public protection, 
through their own enhanced procedural rights in contesting 
the validity and necessity of this stigmatising disclosure to 
myriad criminal justice, health and social care agencies, as 
well as (potentially) to members of the public deemed ‘at 
risk’. These enhanced procedural rights can be and should be 
seen as a kind of ‘inverse surveillance’ conducted by the 
‘risky’. 
Introduction 
It can be acknowledged that human rights, as ensconced as they are 
in the mechanism of the Human Rights Act 1998, have failed to 
thoroughly protect citizens in the UK from inappropriate state 
surveillance, such as the most intrusive kinds of undercover or covert 
policing tactics, and where those particular tactics are supposedly 
legitimate and authorised under the auspices of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and by in some contexts by the police 
themselves.1  
                                            
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Sheffield Hallam University (email: j.grace@shu.ac.uk). 
1 Kingsley Hyland and Clive Walker, ‘Undercover Policing and Underwhelming 
Laws’ [2014] Crim LR 555. 
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The flourishing and complicity of state surveillance practices accords 
with the idea of an ‘amalgam of violence/law’ as put forward by 
Costas Douzinas2—now we can also talk confidently of ‘an amalgam 
of intrusion/law’3—as there is surveillance made overt by the state 
and our law,4 and surveillance covert to the law itself.5  
However, even in a most politically dominated field of surveillance 
and intrusion (specifically the monitoring and ‘risk-management’ of 
‘subject’ ‘risky’ offenders through information sharing, in a public 
                                            
2 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism (Routledge-Cavendish 2007). 
3 Jamie Grace, ‘Privacy as Personal Resistance: Exploring Legal Narratology and the 
Need for a Legal Architecture for Personal Privacy Rights’ (2011) 4(1) The Crit 32.  
4 See Jamie Grace, ‘Privacy, Stigma and Public Protection: A Socio-Legal Analysis of 
Criminality Information Practices in the UK’ (2013) 41 International Journal of 
Law, Crime and Justice 303; Hyland and Walker (n 1). Also, note the way that the 
law regulating state surveillance shifts and responds to challenges to its hegemony, 
e.g. the way that the decision of the European Court of Justice in Case C-293/12 
Digital Rights Ireland to declare the Data Retention Directive in breach of the 
principle of proportionality, given information privacy rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, has resulted in the UK government using emergency 
Parliamentary procedures to rush the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 
2014 onto the statute book in order to (controversially) ‘replicate’ the powers 
under the Data Retention Directive, lest some ill-defined terror manifest itself. For 
this reason, the new Act may be subject to a challenge in judicial review brought by 
some of the very Members of the Parliament that created it: Alan Travis, ‘Drip 
Surveillance Law Faces Legal Challenge by MPs’ The Guardian (London, 22 July 
2014) <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/22/drip-surveillance-law-legal-
challenge-civil-liberties-campaigners> accessed 14 November 2014. This legislative 
example is a classic instance of the recursivity of surveillance and security. For a 
discussion of the relationship between values of surveillance, security and liberty, 
see generally, Conor Gearty, Liberty and Security (Polity Press 2013). 
5 Much of the recent legal debate over the ‘Snowden revelations’ for example turns 
on a given interpretation of the statutory language of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and in turn the Human Rights Act 1998, or an 
interpretation of the Article 8 jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, in relation to 
‘known unknowns’ of surveillance technologies (we know we don’t know exactly 
what surveillance neo-liberal governments place on our communications and 
movements) and thus the pragmatics of the technological realities and actualities of 
communications interceptions as broadly sketched out by the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and now also the Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act 2014. See generally Jemima Stratford and Tim Johnston, ‘The Snowden 
“Revelations”: is GCHQ Breaking the Law?’ [2014] EHRLR 129. 
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protection ‘routine’ of ‘adiaphorisation’,6 as Bauman and Donskis 
have described it),7 the procedural (human) rights of the ‘risky’ can 
be observed as a counter-narrative to the hegemony of public 
protection.8 
The UK Supreme Court has recently9 had to consider how, given 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the sharing 
of criminal records, cautions and other ‘police intelligence’ in the 
‘routine’ of public protection should be calibrated in a proportionate 
manner, since there are considerable tensions between the currency, 
relevancy, and the provenance of that ‘criminality information’ in 
the light of a risk that it may articulate.10 In T and another, the 
Supreme Court determined that the provisions of the Police Act 
1997 which allowed for the creation of Enhanced Criminal Record 
Certificates (ECRCs) for employment vetting purposes, as they 
operated prior to reforms in 2013, were incompatible with the right 
to respect for private and family life under Article 8(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, since they could in some 
circumstances tolerate the unlawfully disproportionate inclusion of 
irrelevant information of poorer provenance, if read literally, given 
the purpose of providing a Certificate in the employment context 
concerned (working with young or ‘vulnerable’ people, including 
children). The Supreme Court did note that the litigation over the 
statutory processes of compiling an ECRC might continue (which I 
would argue is a legalistic form of ‘inverse surveillance’), as 
challenges to the reforms in mid-2013 could be expected.11 
This Supreme Court decision has been the pinnacle of a period of 
development in the relevant common law stretching over ten years, 
                                            
6 Grace, ‘Privacy, Stigma and Public Protection’ (n 4) 318. 
7 Zygmut Bauman and Leonidas Donskis, Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity 
in Liquid Modernity (Polity Press 2013). 
8 Grace, ‘Privacy, Stigma and Public Protection’ (n 4). 
9 R (T and another) v Home Secretary and another [2014] UKSC 35, [2014] 3 WLR 
96. 
10 Jamie Grace, ‘Old Convictions Never Die, They Just Fade Away: The Permanency 
of Convictions and Cautions for Criminal Offences in the UK’ [2014] J Crim L 
121. 
11 R (T and another) (n 9) [53]. 
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and a considerable judicial movement toward respect for the claims 
brought by the risky in the light of their procedural (and human) 
rights.12 This judicial respect for a counter-narrative to the hegemony 
of ‘the politics of public protection’ can be described as augmenting 
the inverse surveillance practiced by those who enter into litigation 
to challenge their adiaphorisation through the sharing of their 
criminality information in that public protection routine. 
Establishing the extent of this ‘inverse surveillance’ as conducted by 
the risky in the face of ‘public protection routines’ involving the 
disclosure and inter-agency sharing of their ‘criminality information’ 
is the chief original contribution of this piece to the broader 
literature on ‘inverse surveillance’.13  
Surveillance in the Form of a Public Protection Routine 
Lord Reed has recently observed in R (T and another) v Home 
Secretary and another: 
The United Kingdom has never had a secret police or 
internal intelligence agency comparable to those that have 
existed in some other European countries, the East 
German Stasi being a well-known example. There has 
however been growing concern in recent times about 
surveillance and the collection and use of personal data by 
the state. Some might argue that the grounds for such 
concern are illustrated … by the information that about 
four million criminal record certificates are provided 
annually under Part V of the [Police Act 1997]. But such 
concern on this side of the Channel might be said to have 
arisen later, and to be less acutely felt, than in many other 
European countries, where for reasons of history there has 
been a more vigilant attitude towards [regulating] state 
surveillance. That concern and vigilance are reflected in 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
                                            
12 Jamie Grace, ‘“Too Well-Travelled”, Not Well-Formed? The Reform of 
“Criminality Information Sharing” in England and Wales’ (2013) 86 Pol J 29. 
13 Grace, ‘Privacy, Stigma and Public Protection’ (n 4). 
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in relation to the collection, storage and use by the state of 
personal data. The protection offered by the common law 
in this area has, by comparison, been of a limited nature.14 
The common law powers of public bodies engaged in what we might 
call ‘public protection surveillance routines’ see a myriad of 
government agencies share information between themselves and with 
the public to further their own politics of public protection, and 
purportedly to reduce the risk of harm to members of the public, 
through monitoring and ‘safeguarding’ processes facilitated by the 
sharing of this ‘public protection risk information’, or what we could 
call ‘criminality information sharing’.  
For the police alone this involves utilising a complex landscape of 
both statutory ‘gateways’ empowering information gathering, 15 
‘disclosure’ or sharing as well as common law powers, in a multitude 
of settings, including the creation of Enhanced Criminal Record 
Certificates through the Disclosure and Barring Service processes; 
providing data for ‘barring lists’ with regard to many public 
protection-sensitive employment roles; the operation of the 
(statutory) Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme; the operation of 
the parallel but common-law-derived Domestic Violence Disclosure 
Scheme;16 the distribution and maintenance of the ‘Sex Offenders 
Register’; and the operation of local ‘Multi-Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements’ (MAPPAs) along with individual–offender–level 
‘Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences’ (MARACs) through to 
local force-by-force ‘naming and shaming’ schemes relating to 
convicted offenders, and even the comparative banality of local 
                                            
14 R (T and another) (n 9) [88]. 
15 See the relevant discussion of the proliferation of such information-sharing 
‘gateways’ on the statute book, across a multitude of different governance contexts, 
in: Law Commission, Data Sharing Between Public Bodies: A Scoping Report (Law 
Comm No 351, 2014) <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc351_data-
sharing.pdf> accessed 14 November 2014. 
16 Jamie Grace, ‘Dodgy DVDS: Some Problems with the National Roll-Out of the 
Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme’ (2014) 97 Criminal Justice Matters 18. 
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‘Pubwatch’ schemes operated in conjunction with Local 
Authorities.17 
These public protection routines’ are underpinned and facilitated by 
surveillance technologies, including but not only the Police National 
Database, the Violent and Sexual Offenders Register (known as 
‘ViSOR’), the (central) National Offender Management Information 
System (NOMIS or C-NOMIS), the Electronic Offender Assessment 
System (E-OASys), the much-critiqued National DNA Database 
(NDNAD), local police databases on interactions with offenders, 
victims and witnesses to crimes, as well as the particular  databases 
held and operated by specialist units of the Metropolitan Police and 
so forth, such as the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder 
Intelligence Unit database of overt and covert surveillance records. 
There can also be seen a supra- and inter-national or European 
context to the above ‘public protection information sharing routines’, 
in relation to the role of Interpol and the sharing of DNA profiles 
under the Prüm Treaty Articles and Decisions, the roles of Europol 
and Eurojust, Mutual Legal Assistance protocols and the European 
Investigation Order, as well as the European Arrest Warrant scheme, 
and the European Criminal Record Information System (E-CRIS) 
database, for example. 
The next part of this piece will briefly consider the way that 
individuals have used the courts to challenge the operation of the 
landscape of ‘public protection information sharing’, as a 
(potentially effective) form of legalistic ‘inverse surveillance’. 
Inverse Surveillance Conducted by the ‘Risky’: Challenging the 
Sharing of ‘Criminality Information’ 
Challenges to the sharing of ‘criminality information’ for public 
protection purposes, mounted by ‘risky’ individuals in the courts 
                                            
17 These ‘criminality information sharing’ landscapes are also inclusive of the areas 
of health, social care and the regulation of issues including ‘anti-social behaviour’. 
See Jamie Grace, ‘A Broad Discretion to Share Patient Information for Public 
Protection Purposes: Statutory Powers of the NHS Commissioning Board’ (2013) 1 
Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 77. 
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through the means of judicial review, will normally turn on the key 
considerations of whether the actual or proposed sharing of that 
information is necessary, legitimate and proportionate under Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which affords all 
individuals a qualified right to respect for their private and family 
life.18 
The cumulative effect of the courts considering the last decade or 
more of ‘inverse surveillance’, of sorts, in the form of stigmatised 
individuals making these kinds of challenges has seen the judiciary, it 
is arguable, producing a multi-stranded test for correct 
proportionality in these kinds of criminality information sharing 
cases in judicial review—often involving a critique by the courts of 
whether an individual has been sought out for an opportunity to 
make representations on the sharing of information that has them as 
its ‘subject’, or whether they have been notified of the sharing of 
their stigmatising information as part of a public protection 
routine.19 
Jamie Grace has argued that regard for ‘provenance’ or ‘certainty’ in 
relation to the potential sharing of a piece of public protection 
information is crucial, as is proper regard for both relevance and the 
passage of time where appropriate, in the context of a correct 
proportionality test to be applied in an instance of criminality 
information sharing, and that as such the relevant configuration of 
the proportionality test should be constructed in the following way: 
In order that an item of criminality information is shared 
for the purposes of public protection [in a way that is 
lawful] it is suggested that the following question should 
be answered in the affirmative: Objectively speaking, is the 
information indicative of the (alleged) commission of a 
sufficiently serious offence which it is reasonably certain 
was committed by the individual concerned, that is 
currently relevant to the purpose for requiring [a 
disclosure for] the purpose of public protection, and which 
the individual [subject] concerned has had an opportunity 
                                            
18 Grace, ‘“Too Well-Travelled” (n 12). 
19 Grace, ‘Privacy, Stigma and Public Protection’ (n 4). 
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to comment meaningfully upon ([particularly] where the 
information is of an allegation, caution, arrest, charge, or 
prosecution not resulting in a conviction [rather than a 
conviction itself])?20 
Lord Reed, in R (T and another), has noted that the European Court 
of Human Rights determined that the sharing of ‘police intelligence’ 
and criminality information for public protection purposes engages 
Article 8 rights of (alleged) offenders, and can be unlawful, if little 
enough attention is paid to the factors of the passage of time, 
relevance in a particular context, and contextual notions of 
procedural fairness. Lord Reed has observed that: 
In the light of the [ECtHR] judgment in MM v United 
Kingdom [2012], it is plain that the disclosure of the data 
relating to the respondents’ cautions [in the T case itself] is 
an interference with the right protected by article 8(1) … 
That [ECtHR] judgment establishes, in my opinion 
persuasively, that the legislation fails to meet the 
requirements for disclosure to constitute an interference ‘in 
accordance with the law’. That is so, as the court 
explained in MM, because of the cumulative effect of the 
failure to draw any distinction on the basis of the nature of 
the offence, the disposal in the case, the time which has 
elapsed since the offence took place or the relevance of the 
data to the employment sought, and the [then] absence of 
any mechanism for independent review of a decision to 
disclose data under section 113A [Police Act 1997].21 
To put this commentary into the context of the ‘risky’ and their 
procedural rights under the law, it is clear that the senior UK 
judiciary are forming the view over time that the surveillance of 
stigmatised individuals in terms of ‘criminality information sharing’ 
amidst a broader ‘public protection routine’ must be carefully 
constructed. By this it is meant a ‘careful construction’ in terms of a 
granularity balanced between factors of not just ‘risk’ and 
‘likelihood of harm’ in the light of the ‘public interest’, or what is 
                                            
20 Grace, ‘Old Convictions Never Die’ (n 10) (emphasis added). 
21 R (T and another) (n 9) [119]. 
Jamie Grace  
 
 287 
sometimes termed the requirement of a ‘pressing need for disclosure’, 
but also issues of relevance, provenance and temporality (i.e. the 
passage of time) as they inform a consideration of what is 
proportionate information-sharing as a form of surveillance in any 
particular instance of the ‘public protection routine’.   
Entering the Narrative: Discussing the Procedural Rights of the 
‘Risky’ 
Societally, we must come to terms with the difficulty of tremendous 
potential fallibility in our midst. But it is human nature to 
marginalise those who we find reprehensible to such extent that they 
are categorised as irredeemable, or forever tainted in history. This 
process of moral marginalisation, or full ‘adiaphorisation’, is by 
definition, and logically, irreversible, or impossible to reverse. If we 
put a man outside the scope of our own morality, making him a 
monster, we cannot retrieve his reputation.  
Bauman and Donskis have explored the manner in which individuals 
attracting the most grave stigma in society can, as a result of our 
‘liquid fear’ and post-modern anxiety, become ‘adiaphorised’: made 
amoral, dehumanised, and devalued.22 There are a raft of models for 
this process of dealing psychosocially with the stigmatised: the Other, 
the Stranger, the Monster,23 or those covered in ‘dark glory’,24 and 
the ‘risky’.25 
However, as demonstrated by narratives concerning the pardoning 
under the Armed Forces Act 2006 of those executed for cowardice in 
the 1914-1918 conflict,26 for example, and the eventual pardoning27 
                                            
22 Bauman and Donskis (n 7). 
23 Andrew Sharpe, ‘Structured Like a Monster: Understanding Human Difference 
Through a Legal Category’ (2007) 18 Law Critique 207. 
24 Sergio Tonkonoff, ‘The Dark Glory of Criminals: Notes on the Iconic 
Imagination of the Multitudes’ (2013) 24 Law Critique 153. 
25 Grace, ‘Privacy, Stigma and Public Protection’ (n 4). 
26 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Pardons for Executed Soldiers becomes Law’ The 
Guardian (London, 9 November 2006) 
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of great mathematician and ‘more deserving’ homosexual Alan 
Turing because of the reflected shame on society given what has 
been seen as a sorry tale featuring mid-twentieth century–
homophobia–driven suicide,28 there are ways, albeit very rare, of 
heroically rehabilitating the formerly reviled.  
How this narrative structuring of rehabilitation (and in saving a 
person or people from the brink of adiaphorisation) can be applied 
to the function of public protection culture involving the risk 
management of the living, in the employment or domestic settings of 
the Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate 29  and the Domestic 
Violence Disclosure Scheme, 30  respectively, remains a difficult 
exercise, however. These operations of public protection surveillance 
through criminality information sharing depend upon the notion 
that malevolence is impossible to forget.31 
If, as this author would argue, the processes and anxieties of 
stigmatisation in public protection contexts are forming a dominant 
narrative, this might not be the most efficacious or sustainable 
approach to thinking about the ‘risky’, since as Jane Fenton has 
noted: 
Decisions about risk cannot always be predicted accurately 
and the ‘actuarial fallacy’ and related thinking lead to 
completely unreasonable expectations that social workers 
can always get it right if they just do their jobs correctly. 
So, risk has become dominant, essentially linked as it is to 
public protection, the neoliberal society we live in and the 
current ‘blame culture’. It is not a surprise that workers 
                                                                                                   
<www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/nov/09/military.immigrationpolicy> accessed 14 
November 2014. 
27 BBC, ‘Royal Pardon for Codebreaker Alan Turing’ (BBC, 24 December 2013) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25495315> accessed 14 November 2014. 
28 Ally Fogg, ‘Alan Turing’s Pardon is Wrong’ The Guardian (London, 24 December 
2014)<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/24/alan-turing-pardon-
wrong-gay-men> accessed 14 November 2014. 
29 Part V of the Police Act 1997 and in that context, Grace, ‘“Too Well-Travelled” 
(n 12). 
30 Grace, ‘Dodgy DVDS’ (n 16). 
31 Grace, ‘Old Convictions Never Die’ (n 10). 
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worry about this. It seems that the task of creating a 
culture where workers can adopt autonomous and 
responsive approaches (essential for desistance work) and, 
thus, live with healthy ontological anxiety (as opposed to 
crippling, overwhelming anxiety) will depend on the 
ethical climate of the agency (support or blame) and the 
acceptance of the inevitability of reoffending.32 
The exercise of actively relaxing and counteracting processes of 
stigmatisation of the (formerly) ‘risky’ is however dominated 
currently by the politics of public protection, despite (sometimes 
successful) legal challenges forming occasional and notable ‘peaks’ of 
‘inverse surveillance.33 
Suggestions and Conclusions 
‘Poem’ (1995), by former probation officer Simon Armitage, 34 
encapsulates the quandary we have as a society in determining who 
is deserving of stigma for the course of their behaviour, or their 
narrative, in life. If a man of some virtues, who ‘praised his wife for 
every meal she made./ And once, for laughing, punched her in the 
face’, is duly punished under the law, or is acquitted following due 
process, moves on and makes new intimate relationships, to what 
extent can we, in a culture of risk-management and public protection 
concerns, meaningfully ‘forget’ what he has (perhaps only allegedly) 
done? As Armitage observes in the last stanza of ‘Poem’, an overview 
                                            
32 Jane Fenton, ‘Risk Aversion and Anxiety in Scottish Criminal Justice Social Work: 
Can Desistance and Human Rights Agendas Have an Impact?’ (2013) 52(1) The 
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 77.  
33 For Mike Nash, this is partly explained by processes of the public protection 
‘reassurance con’. See Mike Nash, ‘A Reassurance Con? UK Public Protection for 
Modern Times’ (Inaugural Professorial Lecture at the Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies, 25 April 2012) <www.port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-
departments/icjs/nash-inaugural-lecture.pdf> accessed 14 November 2014. See also, 
Mike Nash, ‘Cut Price Public Protection?’ (2012) 51(3) The Howard Journal of 
Criminal Justice 261; and Mike Nash and Andrew Williams (eds) Handbook of 
Public Protection (Willan 2010). 
34 Simon Armitage, ‘Poem’ in Simon Armitage, Zoom! (Bloodaxe Books 1995).  
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of a ‘life history’ that includes incidents of domestic abuse and other 
criminality will of course be part of a lifelong patchwork of human 
behaviour: ‘Here’s how they rated him when they looked back:/ 
sometimes he did this, sometimes he did that’.35 
It is difficult to say which voice speaks with the greatest authority in 
the narrative tale of the ‘adiaphorisation’ of both the risky and the 
vulnerable—that of political actors with much to lose, the victims of 
tragedy, cruelty or injustice (whether vulnerable, risky, both or 
neither); or even (an)Other legal culture—in the form of the growing 
hegemony of the Europeanising, neo-liberal doctrines of human 
rights, which has ideological qualities of both security and liberty to 
make up interwoven strands of a new justice based on risk(s).  
Jamie Grace has recently concluded, in commenting on ‘inverse-
surveillance’ cases in the public protection arena, where the courts 
protect anonymity due to fears of the potential suicide by the ‘risky’ 
or their suffering vigilante attacks, such as in ZY, Paul Higgins v 
Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service,36 that  
the positive obligation to prevent risks to life [for example 
shows] that the framework of human rights law in the UK 
[means] that however stigmatised we allow a ‘risky’ 
individual to become in their community, we cannot, and 
do not, allow them to become fully ‘adiaphorised’, that is, 
set outside of all legal norms and human rights values as 
an operation of our own anxiety over the public protection 
risks that they may pose or do pose … .37 
However, it is proposed that if the postmodern critique of human 
rights in neoliberal state settings, and the ‘amalgam of violence/law’, 
or of subjective violence/law,38 is applied to the notion of positive 
obligations to preserve life and dignity in the face of extreme 
stigmatisation for some individuals in society, then we can observe 
that the realities of our notions of (in)dignity and rehabilitation from 
that stigma are extremely vulnerable, rooted as they are in ideologies 
                                            
35 ibid. 
36 [2013] NIQB 8. 
37 Grace, ‘Privacy, Stigma and Public Protection’ (n 4) 318. 
38 Douzinas (n 2).  
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of control, security, power and, thus, sovereignty. We should not be 
distracted from the predomination of the power of state surveillance 
by the media furore and what has been perceived as a threat to press 
freedom occasioned by the decision of the European Court of Justice 
in Google Spain39 to recognise the ‘right to be forgotten’ (in some 
online contexts only of course), with the notion that search engine 
websites must now remove links to stigmatising newspaper articles 
and other content on the web. This ‘right to be forgotten’ is an 
extremely limited and novel one, in practice, and the ramifications of 
it are still unclear, and do not impact at all on issues involving the 
stigmatising process of the ‘public protection routine’ of ‘criminality 
information sharing’.  
There are hints of this in the construction of the notion of the 
(statutory) pardon—forgiven, as the cliché sometimes goes—but not 
forgotten. The idea of a pardon for Alan Turing is a contemporary 
example of this difficulty of forgetting, even in the attempt to 
somehow make amends for the heteronormativity of historical 
offences of ‘gross indecency between men’—a sop to our sensibilities 
over the criminalisation of one of the fathers of the information age, 
and a ‘war hero’. Furthermore, the difficulty and unease we may 
encounter in ourselves, in terms of approaching the notion of a 
pardon for a dead man, is seen in statutory pardons for servicemen 
executed for disciplinary offences (such as cowardice, casting away 
arms, disobedience and desertion in the face of psychological horror) 
in 1914–18, as found in the Armed Forces Act 2006: and their 
statutory recognition thereby as ‘victims of the First World War’.40 
But a pardon is not the expunging of any record, it is historical 
obfuscation, of the worst (since it is the most meaningless) sort. 
These statutory or other pardons do not ‘affect any conviction or 
sentence’ from the past.41 We are meant to, and can only, infer that: 
‘These men were meant to feel shame, and stigma, and even to die in 
this manner, in the time in which they lived. They are victims in the 
moment and in the cause of their passing. This is irrevocable.’ 
                                            
39 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD) (OJ C 212/4, 13 May 2014). 
40 Section 359 of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
41 Section 359(4) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
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On a last and different point, the politics of public protection are 
such that the moral ‘marginalisation’, the ‘Othering’, or the 
‘adiaphorisation’ of the ‘risky’ is completely accepted, and expected. 
This process has become normalised and has occurred to such an 
extent that occasional breaks in this public protection narrative are 
jarring and disconcerting, I propose. But we should not feel surprised 
that individuals might want desperately to become less stigmatised, 
or return from the state of adiaphoria—it is the very nature of 
stigma that we try to ‘cover’ it, or ‘pass’ on it, in order that we might 
prevent or preclude the ‘bridging’ of our (non)stigmatised lives with 
the more shameful histories of our personae.42 
This ‘jarring’, disconcerting effect created by the ‘inverse surveillance’ 
conducted by individuals who (sometimes successfully) challenge, 
through claims in judicial review for example, the sharing of the 
public protection risk information which stigmatises them as ‘risky 
subjects’ is a vital sign, and symptom, of the critical limitations of 
the law—which can never fully allow for true ‘forgetting’ of the 
‘risky’ or the more wholly ‘monstrous’—as well as a symptom of the 
ever-hungry, hegemonous politics of public protection.  
                                            
42 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Doubleday 1959) and 
Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Penguin 
1968). 
